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HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, ) Priority NO. 13 
Defendants/Appellees. ) 
APPELLEE NICKOL'S BRIEF 
Appeal From a Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Affirming Summary Judgment Dismissal 
of Appellants' Complaint 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) and §78-2-2(5), to review the 
Court of Appeals' decision filed in this matter on March 28, 
1990. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the 
District Court's Order of Dismissal on the basis that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case linking Dr. 
Nickol•s conduct to the proximate cause of Tiffany 
Butterfield's death. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may 
govern the Court's analysis of this case. This rule reads, 
in pertinent part, as follows: 
When a motion for Summary Judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. (Emphasis 
added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action. 
The above-captioned lawsuit is a wrongful death 
malpractice action against Thomas E. Nickol, M.D. 
(hereinafter "Dr. Nickol") and other named defendants. 
Appellants Albert John and Angela Butterfield (hereinafter 
"the Butterfields") filed their Complaint against Dr. 
Nickol on September 19, 1986. (Record on Appeal "R." at 
pp. 2-5.) More than a year after the Complaint was filed, 
Dr. Nickol filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dismissal of 
the Complaint on the grounds that the Butterfields had failed 
to produce the requisite medical expert testimony necessary to 
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prove their medical malpractice claims at trial. (R. 131-132, 
145-168.) Appellees Dr. David Okubo and Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital also filed Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 
66-67, 73-103.) After hearing oral argument on December 23, 
1987, Judge Richard H. Moffat ruled in favor of appellees1 
Motions. (See, Order and Summary Judgment attached hereto as 
Addendum "A".) The Butterfields appealed the trial court•s 
order granting summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court's decision on March 28, 1990. (See, 
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals attached hereto as 
Addendum "B".) 
B. Statement of the Facts. 
This is a medical malpractice case based upon the 
alleged failure of Dr. Nickol, an emergency room physician, 
and others to diagnose and treat breathing problems which 
allegedly caused appellants1 minor child, Tiffany Ruth 
Butterfield, to die of sudden infant death syndrome 
(SIDS). 
Tiffany was born to Albert John and Angela 
Butterfield on June 30, 1984 at Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Hospital. (R. at p. 2.) On July 4, 1984, three days after 
Tiffany was discharged from the hospital, the Butterfields 
brought Tiffany to the emergency room at Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital. Dr. Nickol was the emergency room physician 
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on duty that evening. Mrs. Butterfield told Dr. Nickol 
that Tiffany seemed congested and was having some trouble 
breathing. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition pp. 18-19 attached 
hereto as Addendum "C", and Mrs. Butterfield1s Deposition, 
p. 26 attached hereto as Addendum "D".) 
After reassuring himself that Tiffany's condition 
did not demand immediate medical attention, Dr. Nickol 
consulted with Tiffany's pediatrician, Dr. Okubo, to ask 
whether he would like to come into the emergency room and 
examine Tiffany or whether he would prefer that Dr. Nickol 
do the examination. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, pp. 26, 
41-44.) Dr. Okubo approved Dr. Nickol's examination of 
Tiffany over the telephone. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, 
p. 26.) 
After completing his discussion with Dr. Okubo and 
his examination of Tiffany, Dr. Nickol indicated to Mr. and 
Mrs. Butterfield that Tiffany needed no treatment that 
evening for her congestion, and that the Butterfields should 
take Tiffany to see Dr. Okubo the next morning for a 
follow-up examination. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, p. 26.) 
The Butterfields did not take Tiffany to Dr. Okubo the 
next day for the recommended follow-up exam. (See, the 
uncontested facts in Dr. Okubo's Summary Judgment memorandum 
and the medical records attached as Addendum "E".) On 
August 16, 1984, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Mr. and 
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Mrs. Butterfield again took Tiffany to the emergency room 
at Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital. (Mrs. Butterfield's 
Deposition at pp. 40-41, 46.) Dr. Nickol was again on duty 
as the emergency room physician. (Dr. Nickol1s Deposition, 
p. 27.) The emergency room hospital records from Holy Cross 
Jordan Valley Hospital for the evening of August 16, 1984, 
indicate that Mrs. Butterfield told Dr. Nickol that 
Tiffany had been experiencing breathlessness and irregular 
breathing. As with Tiffany's visit to the emergency room on 
July 4, 1984, Dr. Nickol was not able to detect any medical 
condition on August 16, 1984 for which Tiffany required 
immediate medical attention. (Dr. Nickol's Deposition, p. 
29.) Tiffany was discharged from the emergency room that 
evening, with Dr. Nickol's advice that the Butterfields 
take Tiffany to see Dr. Okubo for further pediatric 
examination. (See medical records attached at Addendum flFH.) 
This was the last time Dr. Nickol saw the child. The 
Butterfields did not follow Dr. Nickol1s advice to take 
Tiffany in for an exam by Dr. Okubo. (See, the 
uncontested facts in Dr. Okubo's Summary Judgment memorandum.) 
On August 31, 1984, the Butterfields took Tiffany 
to Dr. Monte McClellan, a family practitioner, for a 
routine checkup. Dr. McClellan again saw Tiffany on 
September 27, November 5, November 30, and December 14, 1984. 
(Dr. McClellan deposition, pp. 7-11 attached hereto as 
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Addendum "G".) On December 20, 1984, Tiffany died from 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). 
After filing their Complaint, the Butterfield's 
allegedly retained Dr. McClellan to give expert testimony at 
trial as to the improper medical conduct of the appellees. 
(Answer to Defendants1 First Set of Interrogatories, 
Interrogatory Answer No. 11, attached at Addendum lfHM.) This 
representation was made on April 7, 1987. However, during his 
deposition taken on October 1, 1987, Dr. McClellan indicated 
that he had, at no time, been retained as an expert by 
appellants to testify in this case. (Dr. McClellan's 
Deposition, p. 47.) Appellants eventually admitted, at the 
summary judgment hearing, that they did not intend to rely upon 
Dr. McClellan to provide them with the medical expert 
testimony necessary to prove their medical malpractice claims 
at trial. (See, Transcript of the Summary Judgment Hearing 
at R. 212.) 
Counsel for Dr. Nickol secured the expert opinion 
of Dr. Michael C. Pinell, M.D., a Utah board certified family 
practitioner and emergency medicine physician. After reviewing 
the emergency room medical records of Tiffany Butterfield 
from Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital for the dates of July 4, 
1984, and August 14, 1984, Dr. Pinell concluded that 
Dr. Nickol's examination and treatment of Tiffany 
Butterfield was "within the standard of care required of 
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physicians specializing in emergency medicine." (See, 
Affidavit attached hereto at Addendum "I".) 
On December 29, 1987, Dr. Nickol filed his Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the Butterfields had 
failed to procure the requisite medical expert testimony 
necessary to prove their medical malpractice claims at trial. 
This Motion came on for hearing before Judge Moffat on 
December 23, 1987, and additional argument pertaining to all 
appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment was heard on January 4, 
1988. 
At the December 23, 1987 hearing, the Butterfields 
argued that the case should not be dismissed for lack of 
medical expert testimony since they had procured the testimony 
of H. Barry Jacobs, M.D. (R. at 212.) Dr. Jacobs' 
affidavit was submitted to the court for consideration on the 
day of the hearing. (See, Dr. Jacobs' Affidavit attached 
hereto as Addendum "J".) After reviewing the affidavit, the 
Court concluded the affidavit was improperly filed and provided 
insufficient proof that Dr. Jacobs was qualified to testify 
regarding the standard of care for emergency room physicians 
such as Dr. Nickol. (See, Transcript of Summary Judgment 
Hearing at R. 212). 
Once the Court had entertained all arguments 
pertinent to the Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court 
granted appellees' Motions on January 27, 1988 and specifically 
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found that the appellees "were not a proximate cause of the 
infant plaintiff's death inasmuch as there were intervening 
events that superseded any misconduct on the part of said 
defendants." (See, Order and Summary Judgment attached 
hereto as Addendum "A.") At the time the trial court entered 
its summary judgment ruling, the court had before it 
uncontroverted evidence that Dr. Nickol had not seen 
Tiffany Butterfield for more than four months prior to her 
death, that Tiffany had been treated by Dr. Monty 
McClellan on at least five occasions during that four-month 
period, and that the Butterfields had not followed Dr. 
Nickol's advice to take Tiffany for follow-up visits to Dr. 
Okubo. (See, Dr. Nickol's Memorandum filed in support of 
his Motion for Summary Judgment and Dr. Okubo's Summary 
Judgment Memorandum at p. 4.) 
The Butterfield's appealed the lower court's order 
granting summary judgment. The Court of Appeals heard oral 
argument on January 26, 1990 and affirmed the lower court's 
decision on March 28, 1990. (See, Opinion, Utah Court of 
Appeals, attached hereto as Addendum "B.") 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals, according due deference to 
the expert affidavit submitted by the appellants, properly 
affirmed the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the 
appellant's Complaint. Dr. Jacobs' affidavit fails to 
establish any causal link between Dr. Nickol's emergency room 
treatment of Tiffany Butterfield and Tiffany's SIDS 
related death. Tiffany died more than four months after her 
last visit with Dr. Nickol, and during that four month period 
she was seen by Dr. McClellan on at least five separate 
occasions. Further, the Butterfields specifically failed to 
take Tiffany to Dr. Okubo for the follow-up visits advised 
by Dr. Nickol. Since these intervening factors isolating Dr. 
Nickol from any connection with the SIDS death were 
completely ignored by Dr. Jacobs' affidavit, the trial court 
and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the appellants 
have failed to put on a prima facie case demonstrating how Dr. 
Nickol could have caused Tiffany's death. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY 
AFFIRMED THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL ON THE BASIS THAT APPELLANTS 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH HOW DR. NICKOL'S CONDUCT 
COULD HAVE PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
TIFFANY BUTTERFIELD'S DEATH 
As the Supreme Court reviews the summary judgment 
rulings rendered in this matter, the Court must scrutinize the 
facts in the light most favorable to the appellants; 
additionally, the Court will review the lower courts1 legal 
rulings for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 
779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, 
Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988). As the Court conducts 
its review, however, it should bear in mind recent U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent stressing the vital public policy objectives 
furthered by granting summary judgment in those cases where a 
plaintiff fails to come forward with a prima facie case. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 276 (1986). Applying the foregoing 
standards to the present case, the Utah Supreme Court should 
affirm the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the trial 
court's summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiffs' 
Complaint. See, Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94 
(Utah App. 1990). Even when the facts of this case are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Butterfields, this 
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Court should rule that the appellants have failed to marshal 
evidence sufficient to establish that Dr. Nickol's treatment 
of Tiffany Butterfield somehow caused Tiffany's SIDS 
related death. 
A. Appellants Failed in the Courts 
Below to Make a Prima Facie Showing that 
Dr. Nickol Caused Tiffany 
Butterfield's Death. 
In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff has the 
burden to prove that the defendant proximately caused the 
injury. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 n. 17 (Utah 
1980) and Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 
P.2d 270, 271 (1987). "In the absence of evidence, there is 
nothing upon which a jury can base its findings on the 
proximate cause of the injury." Huggins v. Hicken, 310 
P.2d 523, 526 (Utah 1957). "The evidence must be substantial 
and must . . . have foundation in expert medical testimony." 
(Id., footnotes omitted). 
In the present case, the undisputed facts are that 
Tiffany Butterfield died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
(SIDS) on December 20, 1984, more than four months after she 
last saw Dr. Nickol in the emergency room on August 16, 
1984. The Butterfields did not heed Dr. Nickol's advice 
regarding follow-up visits with Dr. Okubo. During the 
four-month period between August 16 and December 20, 1984, the 
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Butterfields did, however, take Tiffany to Dr. Monte 
McClellan, a family practitioner, on at least five different 
occasions (including August 31, September 27, November 5, 
November 30 and December 14, 1984) for routine care. Dr. 
McClellan took a complete history of Tiffany's health when 
the Butterfields brought Tiffany in for her first visit. 
(Dr. McClellan's deposition, p.7, attached as Addendum "G".) 
These facts provided the two Courts below with sufficient 
evidence to indicate that, as a matter of law, Dr. Nickol's 
treatment of Tiffany Butterfield was not the proximate 
cause of Tiffany's death. 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enter., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 
1985), the Court defined proximate cause as follows: 
That cause which in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient and 
intervening cause), produces the injury and 
without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause — the 
one that necessarily sets in operation the 
factors that accomplish the injury. 
Id. at 245-246 (footnotes omitted). 
As stated above, Dr. Nickol had not seen or cared 
for Tiffany Butterfield for over four months prior to her 
death. Applying Mitchell to the present case, the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this four 
month period of time, together with Dr. McClellan's numerous 
examinations of Tiffany, logically insulates Dr. Nickol as 
the efficient cause of Tiffany's death. The Butterfields 
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are unable to establish a natural and continuous sequence of 
events that links Dr. Nickol's E.R. exams to Tiffany's 
death since she was seen and treated on at least five separate 
occasions by Dr. McClellan during that time. Additionally, 
the Butterfields' failure to take Tiffany to Dr. Okubo 
for follow-up visits (despite Dr. Nickol's advice to do so) 
further isolates Dr. Nickol from any causal link with 
Tiffany's death. 
It is generally true that the issue of proximate 
cause is a factual issue and in most circumstances cannot be 
resolved as a matter of law. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). However, in certain 
circumstances where the evidence is such that a jury can do no 
more than guess or conjecture as to which of several acts, 
conditions or agencies was in fact the efficient cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries, it is for the Court to decide as a matter 
of law that the plaintiff's case has not been established. 
Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan Ranches, 633 P.2d 1145, 
1148 (Idaho 1981). See, also, Thompson v. Presbyterian 
Hospital, Inc., 652 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1982) (proximate cause 
becomes a question of law when there is no evidence from which 
a jury could reasonably find a causal nexus between the 
negligent act and the resulting injury); McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983) (question of whether 
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proximate cause exists is one for trier of fact unless evidence 
shows that reasonable persons could not disagree). 
Petitioners argue that Dr. H. Barry Jacobs' 
affidavit presents a question of fact. However, the only 
statement Dr. Jacobs makes in regard to proximate cause is 
that, in his opinion, the care provided by the appellees 
constitutes care below the accepted standard and "was the 
proximate cause of the child's demise from SIDS." 
Dr. Jacobs' statement is conclusory and unsupported by 
specific facts that can give rise to a jury question. See, 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (requiring that an 
affidavit in opposition to a Summary Judgment motion must "set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial"). Dr. Jacobs makes no attempt in his affidavit to 
account for and explain events that occurred between the time 
Tiffany last saw Dr. Nickol and the time she died four 
months later, nor does he explain what effect Dr. McClellan's 
care may have had on Tiffany prior to her death. Finally, 
Dr. Jacobs neglects to mention the fact that the 
Butterfields failed to heed Dr. Nickol's advice to take 
their child for follow-up visits to Dr. Okubo on each of the 
days immediately following Tiffany's emergency room visits. 
Dr. Jacob's affidavit fails to establish the 
requisite causal link between Dr. Nickols' treatment of 
Tiffany and her death under the standard set forth in Gaw 
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v, DOT, 798 P2d. 1130 (Utah App. 1990). In Gaw, the 
Court held that an expert's affidavit filed in opposition to a 
summary judgment motion will be sufficient when it articulates 
"the facts upon which the [expert] opinion [is] based . . . if 
the facts are of the type usually relied upon by experts of the 
field (citations omitted)." 798 P2d. at 1137. Dr. Jacobs' 
affidavit clearly fails to specify the factual basis for his 
conclusion regarding Dr. Nickol's causation of Tiffany's 
death. Without a specific factual analysis of how Dr. Nickol 
could have caused Tiffany's death given the four months 
between her death and Dr. Nickol's last treatment of 
Tiffany, and given the five intervening office visits to 
Dr. McClellan, Dr. Jacobs' affidavit fails to set forth 
those facts ordinarily relied upon by experts in order to 
establish their opinions as required by Gaw. Accordingly, 
Dr. Jacobs' affidavit in no way creates a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding Dr. Nickol's alleged causation of 
Tiffany's death. 
The Butterfields have simply failed to establish 
any causal link between Dr. Nickol's conduct and Tiffany 
Butterfield's death. The affidavit of Dr. Jacobs is 
insufficient to create a natural and continuous sequence of 
events connecting Dr. Nickol's care to the SIDS death. 
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B. The Issues of Proximate Cause and 
Intervening Events were Sufficiently Raised 
by Appellees at the Trial Court Level. 
The facts of this case, as set forth in 
Dr. Nickol's Memorandum in Support of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment, indicate that there was more than a 
four-month period between the time Tiffany Butterfield was 
seen by Dr. Nickol until her death on December 20, 1984. (R. 
at 147-48.) Further, the trial court had before it 
uncontroverted evidence that the Butterfields took Tiffany 
to see Dr. McClellan on at least five occasions prior to her 
death. (See,Dr. Okubo's uncontroverted Summary Judgment 
memorandum.) The trial Court also considered, in rendering its 
ruling, the uncontroverted fact that the Butterfields did not 
take Tiffany to Dr. Okubo for follow-up exams recommended 
by Dr. Nickol. (Id.) 
The convergence of four factors gave rise to the 
trial court's summary judgment ruling: (1) The remoteness of 
time and (2) the intervening care rendered by 
Dr. McClellan, coupled with (3) the Butterfields1 failure 
to take Tiffany in to Dr. Okubo for follow-up care and 
(4) the expert testimony of Dr. Michael C. Pinell regarding 
Dr. Nickol's compliance with the requisite standard of care, 
presented the trial court with significant evidence indicating 
that Tiffany's death must have been caused by "intervening 
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events that superseded misconduct [if any] on the part of 
Dr. Nickol.11 Even if Dr. Pinell's opinion regarding the 
standard of care issue is cancelled out by Dr. Jacobs1 
opinion, the remaining three factors outlined above provide an 
ample basis for affirming the Court of Appeals1 decision in 
this case. 
C. The Court of Appeals Properly Ruled 
on Lack of Proximate Cause Even if the 
Lower Court Erred in Referring to 
Intervening Events that Superseded any 
Misconduct on the Part of the Dr. 
Nickol. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals 
correctly states that the allegation of causation is a critical 
element of the Butterfields' prima facie case, and that 
"without proof of proximate cause, the plaintiffs cannot 
recover in tort (citations omitted).11 790 P2d. at 98. The 
Court found that the Butterfields failed to come forward with 
evidence of a causal link and found the affidavit of Dr. 
Jacobs to be insufficient to establish such a link. Id. 
On page two of the Butterfields• Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, appellants argue that the Court improperly 
shifted the burden to appellants to show a lack of intervening 
factors. That simply is not the case. The Butterfields 
never came forward with enough evidence to even make out a 
prima facie case against Dr. Nickol. Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit 
does not establish a causal link between Dr. Nickols1 
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treatment of Tiffany and her SIDS related death. 
Therefore, the burden always remained with the appellantsif and 
Dr. Nickol had no duty to rebut the insufficient evidence, 
In Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1987) this 
Court stated: 
When a plaintiff has failed to make out 
even a prima facie case concerning 
causation, it would be meaningless to 
require defendant to produce substantial 
evidence to rebut evidence which, as a 
matter of law, is insufficient to support 
the award. 
Id. at 1039. 
Since the Butterfields never satisfied their initial burden 
of proof, the burden was never shifted from them. The Court of 
Appeals properly ruled that the Butterfields failed to carry 
this burden due to the insufficiency of Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit. 
Further, the Court of Appeals properly observed that 
Dr. Jacobs' affidavit does nothing to rebut Dr. Nickol's 
strong causation defense put on at the summary judgment 
hearing. 790 P.2d at 98. Dr. Nickol presented the trial 
court with substantial evidence that an intervening event or 
set of events occurred sufficient to isolate Dr. Nickol from 
the cause of Tiffany's SIDS related death. As indicated 
above, not only did the trial court have before it 
uncontroverted evidence that Dr. Nickol had not seen 
Tiffany for more than four months prior to her death, but the 
trial court was also provided with uncontroverted evidence that 
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Tiffany had been seen and treated by Dr. Monty McClellan 
on at least five separate occasions in that four-month period. 
(See both Dr. Nickols' and Dr. Okubo's memoranda filed in 
support of their Motions for Summary Judgment.) In view of 
this uncontroverted evidence advanced by Dr. Nickol, the 
Court of Appeals properly concluded that Dr. Jacobs' 
affidavit doesn't begin to address the factors isolating Dr. 
Nickol from the cause of Tiffany's death. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals correctly upheld the lower court's decision to 
dismiss the appellants' case. 
D. Contrary to Appellants' Contention, 
the Court of Appeals did not Weigh the 
Expert Affidavits Proferred in this 
Case. 
Appellants contend that the Court of Appeals' 
decision must be reversed because the Court improperly weighed 
the expert affidavits submitted in this case. Specifically, 
appellants argue that the expert affidavits submitted by the 
appellees were given more weight and accorded more authority 
than was the affidavit submitted by the appellants' expert, Dr. 
Jacobs. The appellants' argument in this regard is 
incorrect. 
As the Court of Appeals points out on page 97 of its 
Opinion, the Court went out of its way to afford due deference 
to Dr. Jacobs' affidavit and to view that affidavit in the 
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light most favorable to the appellants. 790 P.2d at 97. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeals went so far as to rule that 
Dr. Jacobs was qualified to testify as an expert in all three 
areas of malpractice involved in this case (i.e., pediatric 
medicine, emergency room medicine, and hospital nursing staff 
practice). Id. The Court of Appeals clearly afforded the 
statements and allegations contained in Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit 
every benefit of the doubt. 
Even affording the affidavit its due deference, 
however, the Court of Appeals was forced to conclude that the 
affidavit failed to establish the causal link between 
Dr. Nickol's emergency room treatment of Tiffany 
Butterfield and her SIDS related death some four months 
after that treatment had occurred. The appellants cannot 
contend in good faith that the Court of Appeals failed to 
afford proper deference to Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit simply 
because that affidavit is insufficient to establish the prima 
facie case of proximate cause necessary to allow the 
appellants1 claims to proceed to trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals properly affirmed the District 
Court's Order of Dismissal on the basis that Appellants 
failed to establish even a prima facie case linking Dr. 
Nickol's conduct to the proximate cause of Tiffany 
Butterfield's death. 
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For the above stated reasons, Dr. Nickol 
respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals1 decision in 
this matter be affirmed. 
DATED t h i s fo day of /Qg^rKff-fry , 19 ^O . 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
GARY D.//5TC 
MICHAEL^ A. PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellee Nickol 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—--000O000—-
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH 
BUTTERFIELD, 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICXOL, t 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, : 
Defendants. : 
— — — - 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 -
Civil No, C86-9250 
Judge Richard Moffat 
The defendants David Okubo, Thomas Nickol, and Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital9i Motions for luxamary judgment 
having come up for hearing on December 23, 1987, and the 
court having heard additional arguments on January 5, 1988 
and the court having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits 
in this matter, and the court having found as follows* 
1. Plaintiffs have not established through competent 
or qualified expert .testimony that defendants breached the 
requisite standard of care required of them in the treatment 
administered to the infant deceased plaintiff Tiffany Ruth 
Butterfield. 
2. The defendant Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital 
is not liable to plaintiffs as a matter of law inasmuch as 
the hospital employees involved in this case cannot practice 
medicine, and are not held to the standard required of the 
individual practicing physicians. 
3. In addition, the alleged misconduct on the part 
of all the respective defendants, David Okubo, Thomas Nickol 
and the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, were not a proximate 
cause of the infant plaintiff's death inasmuch as there were 
intervening events that superceded any misconduct on the 
part of said defendants. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE! 
that the motions for summary judgment of David Okubo, Thomas 
Nickol and Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital be and the sauae 
are hereby granted and defendants are awarded a judgment 
against plaintiffs, no cause of action, together with costs. 
A D D E N D U M B 
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Albert John BUTTERFIELD and Angela 
Butterfield, on Behalf of Tiffany Ruth 
BUTTERFIELD, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
David OKUBO, Thomas Nickol, and 
Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, 
Defendant and Respondents. 
No. 880347-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 28, 1990. 
In medical malpractice action, the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Richard H. Moffat, J., dismissed action on 
motion for summary judgment, and appeal 
was taken. The Court of Appeals, John 
Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, held 
that: (1) affidavit in opposition to motion 
for summary judgment was admissible, and 
(2) there was insufficient evidence of proxi-
mate causation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <s=*185.1(l) 
Certificate attesting to proper service 
of affidavit in opposition to motion for sum-
mary judgment was to be taken at face 
value, and unsworn verbal representations 
of movant's counsel about defects in ser-
vice, representations based in part on hear-
say conversations with their office person-
nel, did not suffice to establish facts show-
ing fatal deficiencies in service of affidavit. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
2. Physicians and Surgeons <s=>18.80(8) 
Ordinarily, expert medical testimony 
must be presented in order to establish 
standard of care by which doctor's conduct 
is to be measured and that patient's injury 
was proximately caused by conduct of doc-
tor that fell below that standard; further-
more, the expert testimony, like the stan-
dard of care which is its subject matter, is 
specific to the particular medical specialty 
or area of expertise of defendant. 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sit-
ting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
3. Evidence e=>538 
One physician is not qualified to give 
admissible opinion on treatment provided 
by another physician, unless physician giv-
ing the opinion is shown to have familiarity 
with treating physician's particular area of 
practice. 
4. Judgment <3=>185.3(21) 
While there was reason to question 
whether affiant physician's apparently 
rather eclectic background qualified him as 
an expert in all three of defendant physi-
cians' fields of medical practice, his repre-
sentations of his competence were not so 
patently unfounded or conclusory that his 
opinion concerning standard of care could 
be wholly disregarded on motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
5. Physicians and Surgeons <s=>18.80(5) 
There was no evidence establishing 
causal link between physicians' treatment 
of infant and her death of sudden infant 
death syndrome. 
6. Torts <s=>15 
Element of proximate causation in tort 
case inquires into whether defendant could, 
under the circumstances, reasonably have 
foreseen that harm of which plaintiff com-
plains could result from defendant's breach 
of standard of care. 
David Grindstaff (argued), Quintana & 
Grindstaff, Attorneys for Appellants Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
David W. Slagle (argued), Snow, Chris-
tensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for 
Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hosp. 
Gary D. Stott, Michael A. Peterson, Cur-
tis Drake (argued), Richards, Brandt, Miller 
& Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Thomas Ni-
ckol. 
R. Scott Williams (argued), G. Eric Niel-
son, Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, for 
David Okubo. 
Before DAVIDSON, JACKSON, and 
LARSON \ JJ. 
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989). 
OPINION 
JOHN FARR LARSON, Senior 
Juvenile Judge: 
Albert and Angela Butterfield appeal 
from a summary judgment dismissing this 
action for wrongful death, which they al-
lege to be due to medical malpractice by 
the defendants. Because of a lack of evi-
dence in the record concerning proximate 
cause, we affirm. 
The Butterfields' infant daughter Tiffa-
ny died at home on December 20, 1984 of 
sudden infant death syndrome. She was 
born June 30, 1984. On that day and again 
on July 16, 1984, Tiffany was examined by 
Dr. David Okubo, a pediatrician. On two 
occasions in July and August 1984, the 
Butterfields noted apparent problems in 
Tiffany's breathing and took her to the 
emergency room of Holy Cross Jordan Val-
ley Hospital ("Holy Cross"), where she was 
examined and treated by Dr. Thomas Nick-
ol, an emergency room physician and gen-
eral practitioner. Thereafter, the Butter-
fields placed Tiffany exclusively in the care 
and treatment of Dr. Monty McClellan, a 
family practitioner. He examined Tiffany 
on five occasions in August through mid-
December, 1984. 
Following his August 16, 1984 examina-
tion, Dr. Nickol recommended close obser-
vation of Tiffany's breathing with attention 
to possible cyanosis or blue discoloration. 
However, neither Drs. Nickol or Okubo nor 
Holy Cross referred the Butterfields to a 
physician with more extensive expertise 
specifically in infant breathing disorders. 
They also did not recommend the use of 
home apnea monitoring equipment The 
record does not indicate what, if any, care 
or treatment was provided by Dr. McClel-
lan for Tiffany's breathing problems dur-
ing the last four months of her life. 
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After Tiffany's death, the Butterfields 
sued Drs. Nickol and Okubo and Holy 
Cross (but not Dr. McClellan) for medical 
malpractice, filing their complaint on De-
cember 15, 1986. On August 25, 1987, the 
district court held a scheduling conference, 
after which an order issued stating that 
"All discovery must be completed, includ-
ing the filing of depositions^] by December 
11, 1987." On December 11, 1987, the But-
terfields moved to extend the discovery 
deadline in relation to Holy Cross, and on 
December 23, 1987, in relation to Dr. Nick-
ol. On December 10 and 11, 1987, the 
defendants filed motions for summary 
judgment accompanied by affidavits stat-
ing in essence that the defendants' treat-
ment of Tiffany had not fallen below the 
applicable standard of care and was not the 
cause of her death. The court heard those 
motions on December 23, 1987. The But-
terfields had no expert testimony in the 
record in their favor until the day before 
the summary judgment hearing, when they 
filed an affidavit by Dr. H. Barry Jacobs. 
They attempted service of the Jacobs affi-
davit on opposing counsel that evening 
and/or the next day. The copy intended 
for Dr. Nickol's counsel was left with a 
security guard employed at the office build-
ing at which counsel works, and Dr. Oku-
bo's counsel could not locate any served 
copy until after the summary judgment 
hearing. 
The trial court noted the apparent de-
fects in service of the Jacobs affidavit, and 
seems to have concluded that, with or with-
out the Jacobs affidavit, the Butterfields 
had failed to establish a prima facie case 
because no competent expert testimony in-
dicated either a breach of the standard of 
care or that the defendants' medical treat-
ment proximately caused the child's death. 
The principal2 issues presented are there-
*• The Butterfields also argue that the district 
court should have granted their motion to ex-
tend the time limit for completion of discovery. 
However, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's scheduling of the case. See Utah 
R-Civ.P. 16(b); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Prac-
"<* 11 16.22 at 16-123 (2d ed. 1989). Moreover, 
since the case was properly dismissed on sum-
mary judgment, additional time for discovery 
would serve no purpose. The Butterfields were 
not entitled to delay the summary judgment 
because they failed to proceed under Utah R. 
Civ.P. 56(f). See Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 
314 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceuti-
cal, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct.App.1988); 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 
275, 278-79 (Utah Ct.1987). 
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fore (1) whether the Jacobs affidavit is 
entitled to consideration in ruling on the 
motion, and (2) whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to create a factual 
issue about whether the defendants both 
breached the standard of care applicable to 
each and thereby proximately caused Tiffa-
ny's death. 
Service of the Jacobs Affidavit 
As courts have often noted, a party op-
posing a motion for summary judgment 
that is supported by affidavits and/or other 
evidentiary materials "may not rest upon 
the'mere allegations or denials of his plead-
ing, but his response, by affidavits or . . . 
otherwise . . . must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him." 3 In this case, therefore, the 
Butterfields had to introduce evidence sup-
porting those elements4 of their case that 
had been effectively challenged by the de-
fendants in moving for summary judgment. 
A major part of the Butterfields' evidence 
was the Jacobs affidavit. 
The defendants argue that the Jacobs 
affidavit should not be considered because 
it was not properly served on their counsel. 
Axiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment must not 
merely be filed with the court; it must also 
be served on opposing counsel no later than 
the day before the hearing on the motion,5 
to allow them an opportunity to prepare for 
the hearing. We have previously noted 
that an affidavit that has not been properly 
served should not be considered, and the 
3. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e); Busch Corp. v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); 
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). 
4. Briefly, to recover for medical malpractice, 
the plaintiff must show that he or she suffered 
an injury that was actually and proximately 
caused by an act or omission of the medical 
professional that fell below the standard of care 
for that professional's medical field or specialty. 
See Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
740 P.2d 262 (Utah App.1987); Hoopiiana v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 
(Utah App.1987). 
5. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
motion may be resolved without it. P & B 
Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274, 
277 (Utah App.1988). 
[1] In this case, however, the facts re-
lating to the lack of service were not suit-
ably established. The Jacobs affidavit was 
accompanied by a certificate attesting to 
proper service. The only evidence to the 
contrary in the record is the unsworn ver-
bal representations of counsel about the 
defects in service, representations based in 
part on hearsay conversations with their 
office personnel. While we have no reason 
to question the accuracy of counsel's repre-
sentations, the Jacobs affidavit was never-
theless the principal feature of the Butter-
fields' opposition to the potentially disposi-
tive motions for summary judgment. The 
certificate of service is entitled to be taken 
at face value, unless admissible evidence 
shows it to be erroneous. The representa-
tions of counsel, though entirely credible as 
far as they go, are nevertheless not evi-
dence, and therefore do not suffice to es-
tablish facts showing fatal deficiencies in 
the service of the Jacobs affidavit. We 
therefore consider the Jacobs affidavit in 
determining whether the Butterfields came 
forward with sufficient evidence to war-
rant denial of summary judgment. 
Standard of Care 
[2,3] Due to the technical and complex 
nature of a medical doctor's services, ex-
pert medical testimony must ordinarily6 be 
presented in order to establish the standard 
of care by which the doctor's conduct is to 
be measured and that the injury was proxi-
6. An exception is made where the physician's 
error is so plain and simple that it is within the 
range of ordinary lay knowledge. For example, 
in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), a 
surgeon left a surgical cutting needle inside the 
plaintiffs body, and the court held that expert 
testimony on the standard of care was not need-
ed, in essence because everybody knows that a 
surgeon should not leave inside a sharp, foreign 
object used to make the incision. In this case, 
however, whether the defendants should have 
taken additional steps to prevent future apnea is 
a factual question not within the range of ordi-
nary lay knowledge. 
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nately caused by conduct of the doctor 
hat fell below that standard of care. 
inderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 
!16, 220 (1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 
P.2d 817, 821-22 (Utah App.1988); Martin 
v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah App.1987); 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App.1987). 
Further, the expert testimony, like the 
standard of care which is its subject mat-
ter, is specific to the particular medical 
specialty or area of expertise of the defen-
dant. In other words, one physician is not 
qualified to give an admissible opinion on 
the treatment provided by another physi-
cian, unless the physician giving the opin-
ion is shown to have familiarity with the 
treating physician's particular area of prac-
tice.7 
[4] The expert affidavits submitted by 
the defendants in moving for summary 
judgment indicate both that the attesting 
expert was qualified to render an opinion 
on the standard of care applicable to the 
particular defendant about which he was 
speaking, and that the defendant's treat-
ment of Tiffany did not fall below that 
standard. The question thus becomes 
whether Dr. Jacobs also indicated familiari-
ty with the standards of care applicable to 
the defendants sufficient to warrant con-
sideration of his opinion. In that regard, 
Dr. Jacobs stated: 
1. I am a physician licensed in the State 
of Maryland and am a Board Certified 
Surgeon since 1974. I have past experi-
ence in Emergency Room care at four 
hospitals, and Pediatrics, having cared 
for patients in private practice and hospi-
tals, including the Children's Hospital in 
Washington, D.C. 
3. I am familiar with the Standard of 
Care, applicable in 1984, required in pe-
diatrics and emergency room medicine, 
as well as hospital responsibility for ade-
7
- Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 247-48 
(Utah 1985); see also Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 822. 
*• See Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639 ("In considering a 
motion for summary judgment, it is not appro-
priate for a court to weigh the evidence or 
assess credibilityU)" 
quate record keeping and availability of 
previous records during later follow up 
care for a related complaint. 
Based on those statements, there is reason 
to question whether Dr. Jacobs' apparently 
rather eclectic background qualifies him as 
an expert in all three of the defendants' 
fields of medical practice. However, our 
role is not to cross-examine the affidavit by 
conjecture;8 rather, we take it at face val-
ue, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Butterfields, since they 
lost the summary judgment motions in the 
court below.9 In that light, Dr. Jacobs' 
representations of his competence are not 
so patently unfounded or conclusory that 
they can be wholly disregarded. Because 
Dr. Jacobs' opinion concerning the stan-
dard of care contradicts those of the defen-
dants' experts, it demonstrates the exist-
ence of a dispute of material fact, which 
precludes summary judgment on the ques-
tion of the standard of care. 
Proximate Causation 
[5] However, while Dr. Jacobs' criti-
cizes the defendants' treatment of Tiffany, 
he does not establish the requisite causal 
link between that treatment and Tiffany's 
death. Dr. Jacobs opines that the defen-
dants' failure to prescribe home monitoring 
of Tiffany's breathing, and perhaps also a 
more generalized inattention to Tiffany's 
breathing problems, constitute treatment 
falling below the standard of care. How-
ever, those asserted errors occurred in mid-
1984, whereas Tiffany died on December 
19, 1984, four months after she had been 
placed in the care of another medical practi-
tioner. The defendants argue that these 
facts, along with expert opinion, indicate 
that their treatment of Tiffany did not 
proximately cause her death. Dr. Jacobs, 
however, ignores the causation question. 
[6] The element of proximate causation 
in a tort case inquires into whether the 
9. Branam v. Provo School DisL, 780 P.2d 810 
(Utah 1989); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 
119 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah 1987). 
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defendant could, under the circumstances, 
reasonably have foreseen that the harm of 
which the plaintiff complains would result 
from the defendant's breach of the stan-
dard of care. See Jackson v. Hicks, 738 
P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1987); Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enters., Inc., 697 P.2d 240, 245-47 
(Utah 1985); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 
723, 728-29 (Utah 1985). Without proof of 
proximate cause, the plaintiff cannot recov-
er in tort. Dowell Div. of Dow Chemical 
U.S.A. v. Del-Rio Drilling Programs, 
Inc., 761 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1988); 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 
701, P.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Utah 1985). 
When proximate causation was called 
into question by the defendants in moving 
for summary judgment, it was incumbent 
on the Butterfields to come forward with 
evidence of a causal link between the pur-
ported malpractice and the harm for which 
they seek damages.10 However, there is 
nothing in the Jacobs affidavit to indicate 
that the defendants' medical treatment 
proximately caused Tiffany's death, or 
even caused her death at all. From the 
record, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that the defendants may have erred, but 
fortuitously, their error was not a cause, or 
a substantial enough cause, of Tiffany's 
death.11 The allegation of causation, a crit-
ical element of the Butterfields' prima facie 
case, thus remains unsubstantiated. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that the Jacobs affidavit 
was before the court, absent evidence indi-
cating that it was not properly served. 
That affidavit, though conclusory, never-
theless introduces enough apparently com-
petent expert testimony to create a factual 
dispute on the question whether the defen-
dants' treatment of Tiffany Butterfield fell 
below the applicable standards of care. 
However, even viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the Butterfields, 
there is a dearth of evidence in the record 
to counter the defendants' assertions that 
their treatment of Tiffany did not proxi-
mately cause her death. 
10. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415-16 (Utah 
1990). 
We therefore affirm the district court's 
order of dismissal. 
DAVIDSON and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
I O \ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Erlene Kay STRIEBY, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890124-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 30, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Tooele County, Kenneth 
Rigtrup, J., of manslaughter, a second-de-
gree felony, and she appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) 
State was not required to prove absence of 
self-defense in order to establish prima fa-
cie case of manslaughter, and (2) evidence 
was insufficient to support conviction. 
Reversed. 
Bench, J., filed concurring and dissent-
ing opinion. 
1. Homicide <S=*151(3) 
State was not required to prove ab-
sence of self-defense in order to establish 
prima facie case of manslaughter. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-2-402, 77-17-3, 77-35-17(o). 
2. Homicide <£=>244(1) 
Evidence was insufficient to support 
defendant's conviction of manslaughter for 
shooting of her husband in response to his 
violent physical attack; the weight of evi-
11. Cf. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 642. 
A D D E N D U M C 
1 do n o t . 
2 Q Do you h a v e a copy of the r e c o r d ? 
3 A Yes* 
4 Q Have you r e v i e w e d it p r i o r to c o m i n g 
5 to t h i s d e p o s i t i o n ? 
6 A Y e s . 
7 Q So you can t e s t i f y as to w h a t you 
8 r e c a l l c o n c e r n i n g the first v i s i t on J u l y 4th* 
9 A From the r e c o r d , 
10 Q From the r e c o r d . Do you h a v e an 
11 i n d e p e n d e n t r e c o l l e c t i o n of the --
12 A I do n o t . 
13 Q -- of the f i r s t v i s i t ? W h a t about on 
14 t h e A u g u s t 16th v i s i t -- do y o u have a 
15 r e c o l l e c t i o n of that v i s i t ? 
1C A I do not, o t h e r than from the r e c o r d . 
17 Q if the B u t t e r f i e l d s w e r e p r e s e n t , 
1 8 . w o u l d you be able to r e c o g n i z e them* the 
19 B u t t e r f i e l d p a r e n t s --
2 0 A Ho. 
21 Q -- J o h n and A n g e l a ? Let me ask you 
22 what you remember after reviewing the record of 
23 what occurred on July 4th regarding the 
24 B u t t e r f i e l d child. 
25 A I remember, again, from reviewing the 
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1 record, that the child had been brought in by 
2 the mother complaining of c o n g e s t i o n . And in 
3 evaluating the child it appeared that the child 
4 was awake and alert and could not find any 
5 physical findings with the child that were a 
6 concern. I reassured the mother that I felt 
7 the child appeared to be growing normally. As 
8 I recollect, again, from reviewing the record, 
9 the birth weight was seven pounds, and the 
10 initial visit had a weight of seven and a half 
11 pounds. So that the child had surpassed birth 
12 weight by, I believe it was six days to seven 
13 days of age. And, again, I reassured the 
14 mother that seemed like normal growth. 
15 Q Now what you are telling me is just 
16 what you recall from reading the record. You 
17 don't remember seeing the child. 
18 A That's correct. 
19 MR. STOTT: As he indicated to vou, he 
20 has no recollection at all of either of those 
21 visits, Dave, other than --
22 MR. GRINDSTAFF: That's fine. 
23 MR. STOTT: -- other than reading to you 
24 what is on the written record. 
25 Q Let me ask you, would it be normal 
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was improved with suctioning of the nose. And, 
again, in reviewing it and examining the child, 
did not feel that there were any significant 
abnormalities which, again, under the 
ssessment would be indicated by normal veil 
child check, which is what W.C.C. stands for. 
Q What does this remark, Dr. Okubo who 
did not remember any A.B.O. incompatibility --
what would that mean to you? 
A I spoke with Dr. Okubo and asked his 
recollection about any blood type differences 
between the mother and the baby. And there 
were none, to his recollection. 
Q Do you recall speaking to Dr. Okubo? 
A Again, no independent recollection, 
but from the chart I did speak with him. And I 
would have -- it would have been over the 
phone, although, again, I would just have to 
say that I spoke with him, because I just have 
to rely on the record. 
Q Let's go down to where it says *P" 
And it goes, "parent reassurance." The line 
below, what does that say? 
A Follow-up with Dr. Okubo in a.m. or 
sooner for any increased symptoms. And then 
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1 that's rewritten down at the bottom. Again, 
2 follow-up, Dr. Okubo in a.m., or sooner for 
3 increased symptoms. 
4 Q Do you recall looking at this 
5 report -- does this tell you what parent you 
6 would have seen on this occasion? 
7 A In looking at my record I didn't 
8 indicate, again, whether I saw a mother or 
9 father. In looking at the nurse's record it 
10 would appear it would have been the mother. 
11 Q Okay. Do you have a subsequent 
12 report, August 16th, ^ 4 --? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q -- entitled "Emergency Room" dealing 
15 with Tiffany Butterfield? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Do you have any independent 
18- recollection of this visit, other than what is 
19 on this report? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Let me ask you on this report what 
22 portions would be your own handwriting. 
23 A Again, all of the physician notes 
24 were my handwriting, condition on discharge. 
25 Q When vou receive a oatient -•-
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1 A The time night be mine. I don't 
2 know* 
3 Q Apparently -- would this not be true 
4 that it says that there were problems 
5 b r e a t h i n g ? 
6 A It indicates that the mother was 
7 concerned about an irregular breathing pattern. 
8 She indicated that she felt there were 
9 approximately four second periods where the 
10 child did not breathe, although the child did 
11 not become cyanotic, which is what blue 
12 d i s c o l o r a t i o n is, and that the child was 
13 eating, voiding and stooling normally and that 
14 m o t h e r , again, was concerned about nasal 
13 c o n g e s t i o n . The period, again, of four seconds 
16 without breathing, or an irregular breathing 
17 p a t t e r n , in a new born is not necessarily 
18• a b n o r m a l . 
19 Q Okay. Would you read the part after 
20 the nasal congestion and read to me what 
21 that -- would you read all your notes* and tell 
22 me what that would mean about the condition of 
23 the person that you might have seen? 
24 A The mOm stands for o b j e c t i v e , which 
25 is the physical e x a m i n a t i o n . The general exam 
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1 revealed awake and alert normal, actiye for 
2 age. " H . E. E. N. T. " stands for head, ears eyes, 
3 nose and throat. * P.E.R.R.L.A.• stands for 
4 pupils equal, round, and reactive to light and 
5 accommodation. "E.O.M.I." is external ocular 
6 muscles intact. Fontanel, soft. Mucous 
7 membranes moist. Slight nasal congestion* 
8 Neck supple. Lungs clear. No wheezes, rhonchi 
9 or stridor. Abdomen, bowel sounds present. 
10 Extremities, good color. (Pink). Neurologic 
11 exam appropriate for age. Assessment, normal 
12 well child check. Plan, monitor for increased 
13 respiratory distress with cyanosis (blue 
14 discoloration). Humidifier, bulb suction, 
15 continued formula feeding. Follow up with 
16 Okubo for two month check and immunization, 
17 sooner for problems. Condition at discharge, 
18 good. Time of discharge 0040. 
19 Q Okay. Would you typically ask for a 
20 history from the mother --
21 A Yes. 
22 Q -- of prior problems? From this 
23 report can you tell me whether or not you asked 
24 whether there had been prior problems? 
25 A From the records here it, again, 
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A Hy understanding of SIDS is that it 
is an idiopathic disorder affecting primarily 
males in the first year of life with the peak 
incidence between two and four months; that it 
has a seasonal predilection between October and 
March; that, again, there are certain risk 
factors, that it is the most common cause of 
infant death, has the incidence of about two 
per thousand live births. And that, again, 
there is no -- at least at this time, no known 
cause for the SIDS. It doesn't seem to be 
contagious, doesn't seem to be related to an 
infectious problem, pneumonia, that type of 
thing. 
Q Had you been exposed to actual SIDS 
patients prior to '84, July of '84? 
A Yes. 
Q How many patients? 
A I don't know. 
Q Had you ever referred a patient to 
another specialist for possible SIDS 
evaluat ion? 
A Not the emergency room. Again, in 
working the emergency room the primary job that 
I have as an emergency room specialist is to 
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1 attempt to determine whether a patient needs to 
2 be admitted to the hospital. The majority of 
3 patients will have their own private physician. 
4 And the evaluation of SIDS, or a predilection 
5 for SIDS, usually is going to be started by the 
6 private physician if there is a concern. On 
7 the emergency room physician's shoulders lies 
8 the responsibility of whether a patient, again, 
9 needs to be admitted to the hospital for 
10 observation or care of the individual patient. 
11 So the actual referral for a SIDS evaluation 
12 most times is going to be done through the 
13 private physician's office if there is a 
14 concern, or if there is a concern on the 
15 emergency room physician's part, again, an 
16 admission will occur and then further workup if 
17 deemed necessary by the private physician, not 
18* the emergency room doctor. 
19 Q Okay. As I understand, you are 
20 saying your role was different than the role of 
21 a family physician as an emergency room 
22 physician. 
23 A Definitely. 
24 Q And what you described to me as what 
25 your role as an emergency room physician would 
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1 be -- w h e r e would you l e a r n w h a t your role 
2 w o u l d be as an e m e r g e n c y room p h y s i c i a n ? 
3 A A g a i n , d u r i n g the t r a i n i n g that I had 
4 in f a m i l y p r a c t i c e part of that t r a i n i n g is 
5 s p e n t d u r i n g r o t a t i o n s in e m e r g e n c y rooms 
6 w o r k i n g w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d e m e r g e n c y 
7 p r a c t i c i o n e r s and b e i n g t r a i n e d and s u p e r v i s e d 
8 by them p r i o r to, a g a i n , b e i n g i n d e p e n d e n t . 
9 Q W o u l d an e m e r g e n c y room p h y s i c i a n 
10 r e f e r s o m e o n e who had h e a r t p r o b l e m s , for 
11 e x a m p l e , to the f a m i l y p r a c t i t i o n e r , or 
12 w o u l d --
13 A P o t e n t i a l l y . 
14 Q W o u l d it be c o m m o n for you to refer 
15 s o m e o n e w i t h heart p r o b l e m s to a c a r d i o l o g i s t ? 
16 A Not if they had t h e i r own p h y s i c i a n . 
17 Q If they had t h e i r o w n p h y s i c i a n . 
18 W h a t a b o u t if s o m e o n e had a s k i n d i s o r d e r , 
19 w o u l d you refer them to t h e i r f a m i l y 
2 0 p r a c t i t i o n e r ? 
21 A If they had t h e i r o w n p h y s i c i a n you 
22 are going to contact the patient's own 
23 p h y s i c i a n b e f o r e you are g o i n g to m a k e a 
24 referral to a subspecialist. Again, as a 
25 m a t t e r of c o u r t e s y if n o t h i n g e l s e . But the 
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1 standard at least is to talk to the private 
2 physician b e c a u s e they have a better working 
3 relationship in the dealings with the patient, 
4 They have been taking care of them more than 
5 once or twice, which is the usual situation in 
6 the emergency room. 
7 Q Would that be true even if there is 
8 an emergency s i t u a t i o n , that before you would 
9 bring in a cardiologist or a heart expert, you 
10 would always contact the individual's personal 
11 family physician? 
12 A W e l l , the words "always" are a little 
13 bit difficult to s u b s t a n t i a t e , but given the 
14 absence of e x t e n u a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
15 contacting the private physician is the usual 
16 protocol and standard, that's c o r r e c t . 
17 Q What would be extenuating 
18 circumstances such that you normally wouldn't 
19 go through the family physician? 
20 A Oh, for instance if a person had a 
21 orivate family physician but came in with a 
22 situation needing emergent thoracotomy or 
23 surgery, you might have to call the surgeon to 
24 be involved with a life saving m a n e u v e r and 
25 then call the private p r a c t i t i o n e r . In other 
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A D D E N D U M D 
26 
time we got to the hospital, and I explained to the doctor, 
Dr. Nickol, that she had went blue and that we had to 
stimulate her to catch her breath all the way from our home to 
the hospital. And he checked her out and sort of laughed at 
it and said that there was nothing wrong with her, she's 
developing a breathing pattern and that she'd be fine. And he 
called Dr. Okubo at that time and talked to him, and I don't 
know what was said. And he just told me to call Dr. Okubo 
tomorrow and discuss it with him and I did. 
Q What do you mean, he kind of laughed? 
A They laughed. 
Q Who is "they"? 
A Dr. Nickol and the nurse. You know, they really 
thought it was funny, but I was scared and so was my husband. 
She had quit breathing and they laughed it off like it was no 
big deal, she's establishing a breathing pattern, you're 
bothering me. That's how they made us feel, like we were 
freaking out on our baby, but we weren't. 
Q Did they tell you what they meant by "a breathing 
pattern"? 
A They said that babies have to develop a breathing 
pattern, anybody does. As they get older, they develop 
different breathing patterns, and babies, they develop a 
breathing pattern very slowly. Sometimes they breathe fast, 
sometimes they breathe slow, and he said. Don't worry, she's 
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1 I A Yes , 
2 Q And you didn't see a doctor in the meantime; i s that 
3 correct? 
4 A After the 16th? 
5 Q No, between the 5th of July and the 16 th of July, 
6 you didn't go see another doctor, did you? 
7 A No* 
8 Q When was the next breathing problem or the next 
9 incident with Tiffany, whatever it may have been? 
10 A August 16. 
11 Q Where? 
12 I A At home. 
13 I Q What time of day? 
14 I A It was at night. I don't recall the time exactly. 
15 It was after 8:00. 
16 Q After 8:00 and before midnight? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q What happened? 
19 A Me and John were both home and we both seen her go 
20 limp and lose her breath. 
21 Q Where was she? 
22 I A On the couch. 
23 I Q What were you folks doing? 
24 A Watching TV and, you know, talking with my other 
25 daughter. She was in kindergarten at that time, and we were 
41 
1 talking with her. And we just took her to the hospital again. 
2 Q Mrs. Butterfield, I know that it may be difficult to 
3 go through this, but we need to know the details of what 
4 happened that evening, what you saw her doing, what you folks 
5 did with her. 
6 A She wasn't breathing, that's what we saw. That 
7 night I carried her in the car, and I stimulated her all the 
8 way to the hospital. I didn't pinch her, I had to pat her 
9 back or I would move her up and down like this (indicating) to 
10 get her to catch her breath. Yes, she was not breathing at 
f 
11 that time at all. 
12 J Q In the home, what first called your attention to 
13 her? 
14 I A My kids, I pay attention to all the time. And even 
15 with Melissa when she was a baby, I used to check her to see 
16 if she was breathing, because at the time it wasn't called 
17 SIDS, it was called crib death, and I just had — she was 
18 sitting right next to me, and I used to keep my hand on top of 
19 J her like this. 
20 I Q This is Melissa? 
21 A No, this is Tiffany. And to feel them breathe, and 
22 I did that with Melissa when she was a baby, too. And she 
23 q u i t b r e a t h i n g . 
24 Q And you f e l t her q u i t breathing? 
25 A Yes, I d i d . 
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A We took her in there, she was checked again by Dr, 
Nickol, and he said the same thing, she's developing a 
breathing pattern, don't worry about it, and really made me 
feel foolish. 
Q Did you recognize him that time as having seen her 
before? 
A Yes, 
Q Did you tell him what had happened that evening? 
A Yes. 
Q And his response to you was what? 
A She's establishing a breathing pattern, everything 
else seems to be fine. 
Q Did you disagree with him? 
A I — no, I didn't. 
Q Did you tell him you didn't believe that's what she 
was doing? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q What did he do in terms of checking her? 
A The same as before. 
Q What? 
A Checked her eyes, checked her reflexes, checked her 
breathing, pushed on her belly, checked her private areas. 
Q What was her breathing like there in the hospital? 
A I wasn't a doctor. I didn't take and see what she 
was breathing, but she was breathing. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1
 The plairtiff liffa'iy Ruth ;• itt<*r Meld. *M- ^i 
on Junf • ,:»8 4 , i 
_r:*u. i .is-iijw v'iMteo * id examined the 
intant plaintiff as part of the routine pediatric assessment 
ffs, 
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IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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while at the hospital within the first few days after birth. 
This initial examination revealed that the infant plaintiff 
was in all respects healthy and otherwise normal. 
2. On July 4, 1984, the infant plaintiff was taken 
to the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital Emergency Clinic 
and was seen and examined by Dr. Thomas Nickol. The emergency 
chart for that particular visit indicates a history of decreased 
activity plus congestion in the nose that was improved with 
bulb suctioning. Dr. Nickol assessed the child as completely 
normal and instructed the parents to follow up with Dr. Okubo 
in the morning or sooner for increased symptoms. Plaintiffs, 
Mr. and Mrs. Butterfield have testified in their depositions 
that the infant plaintiff had short periods where she was 
not breathing that evening of July 4, 1984, that she had 
become listless and limp until stimulation would arouse her. 
Mr. and Mrs. Butterfield also testified that by the time 
they arrived at the emergency room the infant was breathing 
normally. 
3. Mrs. Angela Butterfield has testified that she contacted 
Dr. David Okubo on the morning of July 5, 1984, but there 
is no record of a telephone call and Dr. Okubo does not have 
a memory of said call being made. 
4. On July 16, 1984, Mrs. Angela Butterfield brought 
the infant plaintiff, Tiffany Butterfield, to defendant 
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Dr. David Okubo for a pro-a: ranged mi'dic)] 4,ini* 
obtained ,-i --.jc-*^ ,-.. ... *-, . , ..-caoiun 
.>i -i.s.abv» ^ office notes indicate 
: iicat tner^ was stnv^ rnstr-1", gasp.c" witnuut ar r 
change *"!'::•' emperamer ; w„ ictive 
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 t ;'*nt : f ; o-i ' nai i he in! int had 
good growth and development and that there was 1 
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irregu, i breathing pattern with lour second n* - breach- •* 
and w i t h out b1ue d i s co1o r a t i ^  
chi al . .. , i^rr. ana suggested to the 
p a r e n t s that they monitor the <h:Id ici increased respiratory 
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distress with cyanosis or blue discoloration. Even though 
Dr. Nickol suggested a follow up with Dr. Okubo for the two 
month check up, Mrs. Butterfield has testified that she had 
essentially terminated the physician/patient relationship 
with Dr. Okubo at this time. 
7. Although plaintiffs have testified that there were 
much more serious symptoms that occurred on August 16, 1984, 
than were reported by Dr. Nickol, it is undisputed that this 
was not reported to Dr. Okubo at any time. 
8. The infant plaintiff's care was transferred to Dr. 
Monty McClellan as of August 31, 1984, and Dr. McClellan 
saw the infant plaintiff on August 31, September 27, November 
5, November 30 and December 14, 1984, for various symptoms 
or problems totally unrelated to the breathing problems that 
were allegedly reported to the other physicians. Dr. McClellan 
has testified that the plaintiff parents did not at any time 
report any problems with breathing or blue discoloration 
or the need to stimulate the child. 
9. The infant plaintiff died from sudden infant death 
syndrome on December 20, 1984. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT OBTAINED 
A PEDIATRICIAN OR ANY OTHER 
PHYSICIAN AS AN EXPERT WITNESS 
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ft 
You are 
A. 
a 
A. 
a 
kind of 
A. 
Q. 
I understand that you did see Tifrany Butterfieldj 
referring to your office records now, I assume. 
Yes, I am. 
Could you tell me when you first saw her? 
I first saw her on August the 31st, 1984. 
When you saw her, did her mother give you any 
history? 
Normally you always take a history. 
Can you tell me, then, what history you were 
provided with at that time? 
k That she was a normal birth, seven pounds, 
eighteen and a half-inch baby, that had no difficulty 
with pregnancy, that the chief complaint at that time 
was she had a rash, or she had a whitish material on 
the inside of her mouth, and that was a thrush and that 
was treated. 
a Did she mention at this time any apnea or problems 
with breathing? 
A. 
a 
NO. 
Did she mention any problems at all besides 
the rash? 
A. 
ft 
No. 
Did you then schedule just a routine follow 
up or did she call the next time she was to visit you? 
A. I would have normally scheduled a follow up. 
7. 
1 I donft recall whether I asked her to return specifically 
2 or whether that was her own idea, but I normally would 
3 have asked her to come back and then to start her 
4 immunization schedule, 
5 ft Did she report on this first visit any complaint 
6 of listlessness? 
7 A. No, 
8 I ft In Tiffany? 
9 A. No. 
10 ft Or congestion? 
11 A. No, 
12 ft What were your impressions, if you can remember? 
13 A. Just that she was a healthy baby and she had 
14 oral thrush. 
15 ft When you saw her the next time, can you tell 
16 us the date and what your findings were. 
17 A. It was 9-27-84. Basically it was the same 
18 thing, it was normal well baby examination. Her head, 
19 ears, nose, eyes and throat were within normal limits. 
20 Fontanel was normal, the tear ducts were open, the yeast 
21 infection, intraorally was recovering with the microstatin 
22 I had given her. Her chest was clear, normal sinus rhythm. 
23 No abdominal masses, umbilicus was healed. No hernia, 
24 no hip click. Feet were normal. DPT and oral polio 
25 were given that day and she was scheduled for return 
1 at two months. 
2 Q, At this time was it your understanding that 
3 you were this childfs primary physician? 
4 A. As far as I knew. 
5 Q. Was it your understanding that she was seeing 
6 you exclusively or did you know whether she was seeing 
7 other physicians, or did you know either way? 
8 1 A. I donft recall, honestly. 
9 Q. Do you recall on this second office visit having 
10 any discussions regarding apnea, congestion? 
11 A. She didn't relate that the child was having 
12 any difficulties like that. 
13 (i I won't go into the specific office visits. 
14 I also have a copy of your records but I did want to 
15 ask you a couple of questions about it. 
16 Were you also seeing the mother at this time 
17 as a patient? 
18 A. Yes, I believe I was. 
19 Q. Do you recall seeing her in r.he emergency room 
20 during the same period of time? 
21 A. It would have been about the same period of 
22 time but I don't have my records in front of me, I can't 
23 tell you exactly which date. 
24 Q, You don't have the records for the mother? 
25 A. Well, that wasn't what we were supposed to 
9. 
1 talk about today. I thought it was just about Tiffany 
2 and so— 
3 Q. Those are the only records you have? 
4 A. I could get them but, I haven't reviewed them 
5 oj: anything like that so— 
6 Q. We will stick with Tiffany just to stay sequential] 
7 then, and then we could talk about the mother more later. 
8 A. Okay. 
9 Q. So your understanding, then, you saw the child 
10 six times; is that correct? 
11 A. Actually I believe I saw the child— 
12 Q. Five. Excuse me. 
13 A. Five times. 
14 Q. Because the December 22nd visit was just with 
15 the mother? 
16 A. Yes, it was. 
17 Q. And during these five visits from August until 
18 December, did the mother mention anything to you about 
19 problems with breathing, or problems with congestion, 
20 or listlessness, discoloration, any of those things? 
21 A. Yes, on one occasion. I'm sorry. Two occasions. 
22 she told me on November the 5th that the child had been 
23 having some mucus in her nose and that was treated. 
24 I thought she had a serous otitis media and 
25 when I saw her back on the 30th that had resolved. 
10. 
1 I did see her again on the 14th of December 
2 and she related that the child had mucus in her upper 
3 respiratory tract. The previous treatment had been effective 
4 so I reinstituted itf and then I did not see her after 
5 that. 
6 Q. Could you tell me from your notes on the 14th 
7 what was the previous treatment? The Rondec? 
8 A. Rondec, DM. 
9 ft And so you continued it because— 
10 A. It recurred. 
11 ft It recurred. Because it had resolved it by 
12 the 30th? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 ft And could you explain to me what SOM is again? 
15 A. Serous otitis media. 
16 ft And what is that? 
17 A. That is where you have fluid behind the ear 
18 but it is not of an infectious nature. 
19 ft And was the condition complained of on the 
20 14th the same thing; SOM, or was it something different? 
21 A. No. That was what she had on that one occasion 
22 on the 5th of November and on the 14th of December that 
23 was not present. 
24 ft And the complaint of the 14th was just— 
25 A. That the mucus was present in her nose. 
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4. Whether any written report, tapes, or 
photographs were taken or prepared concerning 
the examinations, 
j. Whether the expert has previously testified 
in any prior medical malpractice actions; 
k. If so, state: 
1. The caption or each such case in which 
testimony was given, including names of parties, 
court and court case numbers. 
2. Nature and substance of testimony; 
3. Name and addresses of the attorney who 
procured the testimony. 
ANSWER: 
a. Michael C. Pinell 
b. A C.V. is attached as Exhibit "A." 
c. A C.V. is attached as Exhibit "A.11 
d. August 10, 1987. 
e. Expert witness fees have not yet been 
established. 
f. August 10, 1987. 
g. August 10, 1987. 
h. The medical care rendered by Dr. Thomas 
Nlckol on July 4, 1984, and August 16, 1984, was 
performed within the accepted standard of care 
required of physicians specializing in emergency 
medicine. 
i. No. 
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A D D E N D U M I 
GARY D. STOTT (A3130) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER * NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Thomas Nickol 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 S. Main St. 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lalce City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN and ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiff*, 
v s
« 
DAVID OKUBO, M.D., et al., 
Defendants. 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
I MICHAEL C. PINELL, M.D. 
I Civil No. C86-9250 
I Judge Richard Moffatt 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF f^IHxA. ) 
Michael C. Pinell, M.D., being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in 
the State of Utah, and am board certified with the American Board of 
Family Practice, Fellow American Academy of Family Practice, 
American Board of Emergency Medicine and Fellow American College of 
Emergency Physi; ?*i~s. 
2e My education and training are outlined in my* 
Curriculum Vitae, attached as Exhibit "A". 
3. I have been involved in the practice of medicine as an 
emergency room physician in the State of Utah during the time in 
question in the Complaint of Mr. and Mrs. John Butterfield. I am 
familiar with the standard of care required of adequately-trained 
emergency medicine physicians in Salt Lake City, State of Utah 
during that time. 
4. The opinions set forth in this Affidavit are based on 
my review of the medical records of Tiffany Butterfield from: 
a. Dr. Kenneth D. Hunter; 
b. Dr. David Okubo; 
c. Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital 
1) Inpatient record dated 6/4/84 and, 
2) Emergency room records dated 7/4/84 
and 8/16/84; 
d. The State Medical Examiner. 
5. Based upon my review of the medical records listed 
above, and based on my expexrtise as an emergency medicine physician, 
it is my opinion that the medical care rendered by Dr. Thomas 
Nickol to Tiffany Butterfield on July 4, 1984 and August 16, 
1984, was performed within the accepted standard of care required of 
physicians specializing in emergency medicine. 
DATED this '^H^ day of Uyf*+*[>'* , 1987. 
MICHAEL C. PINELL, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO/before me th,is £ V day of 
, 1987. 
Residi 
Hy Commission Expires: 
—4~u 
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A D D E N D U M J 
IK THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAXE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA * 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on x 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH AFFIDAVIT OP H. BARRY 
BUTTERFIELD, I JACOBS, M.D. 
Plaintiffs, t 
-vs- * Civil No. C86-9250 
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL, : Judge Richard Moffatt 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, t 
Defendants. * 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
H. Barry Jacobs, M.D., being first duly sworn on oath 
deposes and states: 
1. I am a physician licensed in the State of Maryland 
and am a Board Certified Surgeon since 1974. I have past 
experience in Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and 
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in private practice and 
hospitals, including the Children's Hospital in Washington-, D.C. 
2. I have reviewed the emergency room and pediatric 
records of the Decedent, Tiffiany R. Butterfield, as well as the 
depositions of her Parents, Albert and Angela Butterfield, and 
have met with Albert Butterfield. 
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care, applicable 
in 1984, required in pediatrics and emergency room medicine, as 
well as hospital responsibility for adequate record keeping and 
availability of previous records during later follow up care for 
a related complaint. 
4. After a thorough review of the available data I am of 
the opinion that care below an acceptable standard was provided 
to Tiffany Butterfield by Dr. Nichol, Dr. Okubo, and the Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospial with the specifics related below. 
5. Assuming the facts as related in the parent's 
depositions to be true, the history of present illness and/or 
chief complaints gathered by the hospital nursing staff and Dr. 
Nichols on 07/04/84 fail to detail the fact that actual apnea was 
observed by the parents and there was cyanosis* Also omitted was 
the fact that the child required stimulation such as pinching or 
shaking before respiration was resumed. Given the lack of 
significant findings on exam to account for respiratory 
compromise and/or the apparent concern and anxiety of the 
parents# such an omission contributed directly to the failure to 
consider SIDS in a differential diagnosis. 
6. When the child was taken as directed for pediatric 
evaluation on 07/16/84 by Dr. Okubo a vague reference was made 
concerning the fact that the child did have unexplained 
respiratory problems. Once again, an inadequate history lead to 
an incomplete assessment and second failure to consider the need 
to rule out SIDS as an etiological possibility* 
7. The second emergency room visit of 08/16/84 did 
contain a somewhat unclear reference to periods of apnea not 
associated with cyanosis. This is refuted by the parent's 
deposition in that the child had been observed to have cyanosis 
with the apnea and once again required stimulation while being 
transported to the hospital that did resolve the cynosis. 
8. It is alleged that the prior emergency room record of 
07/04/84 could not be obtained. Such data* should have been 
available. This would have reinforced the fact that unexplained 
respiratory problems existed and a differential diagnosis 
including SIDS should have been developed. 
9. The physical exam as recorded by Dr. Nichols on 
08/16/84 failed to note any cardiac findings* The discharge 
instructions did imply some need for monitoring the infant and 
that the child should be re-evaluated by the Pediatrician* The 
child's parents insist they did not receive any follow-up 
recommendations and therefore were unaware of the need for same* 
10* There are no records available to detail what was 
recorded during a third emergency room visit on or about 
10/01/84. The parent's deposition indicates the child again had 
an apneic episode and required stimulation* The deposition goes 
on to insist that a concern about SIDS was raised and discounted 
by Dr. Nichols as a possibility even though no other etiology had 
surfaced to explain the child's problems or account for the 
degree of parental concern and/or anxiety. 
11. On 12/19/84 Tiffany Butterfield did indeed die from 
SIDS. This would easily have been avoided to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty by either in-hospital observation and 
monitoring for apnea followed by the issuance of a home apnea 
monitor, or simply arranging for a home apnea monitor. 
12. While one could perhaps argue that such care was not 
warrented following the 07/04/84 emergency visit, I am of the 
opinion that such care was justified after the 07/16/84 pediatric 
check-up and/or the 08/16/84 and 10/01/84 emergency room visits. 
Drs. Okubo and Nichols and a duty to insure necessary follow-up 
was carried out and failed to do so. 
13. The abovei in my opinion, constitutes care below an 
accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate cause of the 
child1s demise from SIDS. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this3 1 day of Decemberf 1987. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this^l^* day of 
December, 1987. 
y* {111 t I t^^liU K A - ' 
NotaryiPublic * Residing ats 
Faye Arasim 
Reston# VA 
My Commission Expires: 
My Commission expires May 18.1QM 
